A. BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME TO ENGLAND
When the European Convention on Human Rights became directly enforceable in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, the government declared that it was bringing "human rights home". 1 For the sceptical, however, the puzzle was how English law, a remedies-based system, would accommodate the Convention, a rights-based document. That confl ict was particularly apparent in relation to privacy. The right to privacy was clearly within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention, but it had not previously been protected by any specifi c English remedy. 2 Nonetheless, Lord Irvine of Lairg, the then Lord Chancellor, pronounced that the government was "not introducing a privacy statute"; 3 and, although a cull of "sacred cows" was predicted, 4 the judiciary, in varying degrees, was unpersuaded that the creation of a tort of invasion of privacy was, in the fi rst place, within the bounds of judicial creativity or, in the second place, necessary. By 2003, Gavin Phillipson refl ected in relation to privacy that the English courts had "not even gone as far as enquiring explicitly whether the common law is in harmony with the Convention, let alone determining what should be done if it is not". 5 And so the "P word" 6 has remained largely unspoken in the English courts. Although 11 [2006] 3 WLR 125 at para 30. 9 A further, crucial, development has been the remarkable expansion of breach of confi dence -in England an equitable, not a tortious, doctrine.
In the classic formulation of breach of confi dence, an action lay where information: had the necessary quality of confi dence; was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confi dence; and was used in an unauthorised way to the detriment of the original party communicating it.
10 However, the English courts have accommodated a wide range of privacy cases within breach of confi dence by progressive reinterpretation of the second requirement (obligation of confi dence). In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (the "Spycatcher" case), Lord Goff observed that a duty of confi dence could arise "in equity" between parties where there was no contractual or similar relationship, 11 and these remarks have formed the basis for the extension of the doctrine to situations where there is little if any previous relationship between defendant and owner of the confi dential information. Private information may have been obtained by subterfuge, for example by a rogue photographer taking surreptitious photographs of an unwitting and unwilling subject. 12 Nevertheless, in the words of Lord Nicholls in the leading recent case of Campbell v MGN: 13 This cause of action has now fi rmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial confi dential relationship… Now the law imposes a "duty of confi dence" whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confi dential.
As yet, however, breach of confi dence has not proved infi nitely elastic in England. The need for a pre-existing confi dential relationship may have been discarded, but information must still "have the necessary quality of confi dence". The diffi culty is that all that is private, meriting protection under Article 8, cannot necessarily be "shoe-horned" 14 into the defi nition of confi dential. Privacy may have been invaded in a public place, in which case it is artifi cial to argue that confi dentiality has been breached. 15 Or private information may have lost confi dentiality through publication, but still be suffi ciently sensitive to merit protection. And by no stretch of the most analysis Vol 11 2007 fl exible defi nition could the wrong suffered in Wainwight v United Kingdom, 16 an inappropriate strip-search, be categorised as breach of confi dence or even as "misuse of private information" (the "essence" of breach of confi dence as now "encapsulated" in Campbell).
17 Even now, therefore, breach of confi dence cannot be made to do all the work of a law of privacy.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WAINWRIGHT v UNITED KINGDOM
The Wainwrights, mother and son, pursued a claim through the English courts after suffering a humiliating strip-search during a prison visit to another son of the family in January 1997. The prison offi cers involved had not followed the statutory procedures for such searches, and the Wainwrights were awarded damages in Leeds County Court for trespass to the person, on the basis that they had been caused to do something which infringed their right to privacy. That award was overturned by the Court of Appeal, 18 whose decision was upheld in the House of Lords. 19 Their Lordships declined counsel's invitation to declare that a tort of invasion of privacy existed, 20 and held that common law principle could not be extended to admit such a tort. In the absence of a general privacy tort, no other ground of liability was found, 21 although a modest, undisputed, sum was awarded to the son under the head of battery, since he had been touched inappropriately by an offi cer. In Lord Hoffmann's view, there was nothing in the court's reading of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to suggest "that the adoption of some high level principle of privacy is necessary to comply with article 8 of the Convention".
22
The Wainwrights subsequently argued before the European Court of Human Rights that the strip-searches had infringed Article 3 (protecting against inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 8 (protecting respect for private life) of the Convention. In its judgment, which was issued on 26 September 2006, 23 the Court distinguished between Article 3 and Article 8. The treatment received by the Wainwrights was not, it was said, suffi ciently extreme to be regarded as "degrading" within the meaning of Article 3, but it showed inadequate respect for their private life in terms of Article 8. The Wainwrights had been visiting a member of their family in the prison. Given the background of drug abuse among inmates at the prison, body searches might in principle have been justifi able, but the prison staff had failed to observe the proper procedures to protect the dignity of those being searched. Moreover, stripsearching in this manner could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society", within the meaning of Article 8(2). Consequently, the UK government had infringed Article 13 of the Convention (failure to provide an adequate remedy for violation of Convention rights).
Since the incident in question had occurred in 1997, before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, Article 8 could not be directly invoked against the authorities responsible for the prison, and no alternative avenue was available to the Wainwrights in English law. The Court noted that: 24 the House of Lords found that negligent action disclosed by the prison offi cers did not ground any civil liability, in particular as there was no general tort of invasion of privacy. In these circumstances, the Court fi nds that the applicants did not have available to them a means of obtaining redress for the interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.
On this basis, damages were awarded to mother and son.
The problem brought into focus by Wainwright v UK is that privacy may be infringed in a way which violates Article 8; yet, in the absence of a general privacy tort, there are some situations in which the claimant may be left without a remedy in English law. While sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 make Convention rights directly actionable against public authorities throughout the UK, that avenue is not open in disputes between private parties. Yet the European Court of Human Rights has previously ruled that Article 8 imposes a positive obligation on states "to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves". 25 Indeed, shortly after its decision in Wainwright, the House of Lords stated, in Campbell v MGN, that "the values underlying articles 8 and 10 are not confi ned to disputes between individuals and public authorities". 26 The immediate problem for English lawyers is therefore how the common law can make good any further gaps in the protection of rights secured under Article 8 -and indeed other Convention rights -in disputes between individuals. This might be done by the creation of a privacy of tort, or by further decanting of privacy into other categories. The question, however, is no longer whether this development is necessary, but how it can be achieved.
C. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In its continuing reluctance to give direct recognition to protection of privacy, England remains apart from other European jurisdictions. It is of course unlikely that Portalis and his colleagues had considered the possibility of egregious strip searches or lurid tabloid exposés when they set about composing the Code Napoléon. But, contrary to comparative law stereotype, in the codifi ed systems of mainland Europe it has often been judges rather than the legislators who have led in responding to changing social and cultural expectations by developing a case law on privacy through the interstices of the Code. In France, for example, the amendment of the Code civil to include the right to privacy in Article 9 27 is widely regarded as codifying well-established judge-made law. 28 It is somewhat paradoxical that judicial creativity has been rather more inhibited in Europe's leading Common Law jurisdiction. Moreover, England is becoming increasingly isolated even in the Common Law family. In the jurisdictions of the United States, a law of privacy has been recognised for a century or more, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has recently resolved to call privacy exactly that, 29 and a Privacy Bill was laid before the Irish legislature in the summer of 2006.
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D. THE FUTURE FOR PRIVACY IN SCOTS LAW
Scotland, of course, has had its own "Wainwright", in the form of the 1988 Outer House case of Henderson v Fife Police 31 in which a woman detainee was awarded damages after being compelled to remove her bra while in police custody. Lord Jauncey's judgment takes a broad-brush approach, reasoning that this was an invasion of "privacy and liberty". 32 Ironically, the central authority upon which he relied was an English case, also arising out of an inappropriate strip search -Lindley v Rutter.
33 Both Henderson and Lindley were apparently cited to the House of Lords in Wainwright, although it is not clear why their Lordships were unpersuaded by them. Henderson apart, there is little evidence that protection for privacy is more securely established in Scotland than in England. 34 Nonetheless, some important points of difference require comment.
(1) Privacy by other names: breach of confi dence
Like English law, Scots law protects privacy under a variety of other names. Defamation, for instance, may be used, 35 although the defence of veritas means that much that is private is outwith its reach. Passing off may well develop along the same lines as in the English courts. However, the use of breach of confi dence to make good gaps in protection of privacy is problematic. As Wainwright demonstrates, there are some aspects of an individual's private life which cannot be categorised as confi dential information. Additionally, in Scotland, where breach of confi dence is located in the law of 28 This process is analysed in R Lindon, Les droits de la personnalite (1974) delict, 36 while there may be authority for the extension of confi dentiality to a third party receiving information knowing it to be confi dential, 37 there no clear authority to extend it in the open-ended way now apparently accepted for English law by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN. Indeed there is at least Outer House authority doubting the basis for such extension.
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(2) Recognition of privacy in Scots Law?
As argued previously in this journal, 39 Scots law, unlike English law, cannot be characterised as primarily a remedy-based system, and the forms of action, which have constrained the development of new English torts, have no counterpart in Scots law. Of course, there is no disputing the substantial convergence of the English and Scots law of negligence, and the structural resemblance between the intentional delicts and the English torts as a "tangle of crisscrossing categories". 40 However, the "intellectual superstructure" 41 of the law of delict remains distinct from that of the English law of torts. The law of delict remains in the singular, and the nominate heads of liability are underpinned by general principle. 42 Thus there are no structural reasons why the list of protected interests should be regarded as closed, and it may exceptionally be capable of further development if there are cogent reasons why a particular category should be recognised. 43 There is therefore no compelling need for Scots law to "shoe-horn" protection of privacy into another ill-fi tting category of liability, and certainly no assistance to be derived from the law of equity in so doing. Equally, there is no fundamental reason why, if privacy requires recognition, as evidently it does in terms of Article 8, the Scots courts must share the squeamishness of the English in pronouncing the "P word". Doing so may permit them to articulate more clearly not only the boundaries of privacy but also the important values which must be balanced against it. 44 
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